By Jussi Haukioja, James R. Beebe
Should philosophy of language use experimental tools, or can it's pursued within the armchair? Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language represents a balanced number of positions in this widely mentioned query.
In the 1st selection of its style, top specialists within the box current a couple of assorted views at the relevance of experimental tools in philosophy of language, starting from whole dismissals of conventional the way to defences of armchair ways. in addition to exploring attainable novel experimental concepts, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language evaluates the philosophical relevance of latest experimental effects and offers new info from new experimental reviews. For students trying to remain prior to the most recent advancements and developments within the philosophy of language, this significant contribution to the sphere brings the reader up-to-date.
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Extra info for Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language
However, I would recommend this method to other philosophers of language interested in their discipline’s metaphilosophy: Look and see whether intuitions play some fundamental role. This looking and seeing must be carried out before we can properly assess contributions to experimental philosophy of language. I think it is safe to say, right now, that experimental work on intuitions about the Gödel Case is irrelevant. And I also think that, to the extent that experimental philosophy of language has been motivated by the Heavy Evidence passage, it is poorly motivated.
We can look for more direct evidence Testing Theories of Reference 39 in scientific tests. In such a scientific test we examine the reality the intuition is about. These scientific examinations of reality, not intuitions about reality, are the primary source of evidence. The examinations may lead us to revise some of our initial intuitions. They will surely show us that the intuitions are far from a complete account of the relevant bit of reality. 425) The intuitions in question here are ones identifying objects as having properties of the sort adverted to in the very theory being tested; for example, intuitions about fish when testing a biological theory of fish, about money when testing an economic theory of money and about reference when testing a semantic theory of reference.
So we should prefer the intuitions of philosophers. So far as I know, perceptual judgements about reference by the folk have not played a significant evidential role with theories of reference. But judgements of this sort by philosophers surely have. I have given this example: my intuitions about names, formed when I first heard Kripke in 1967, “have been confirmed, day in and day out for forty years, by observations of people using a name to refer successfully to an object that they are ignorant or wrong about” (2011c, pp.
Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language by Jussi Haukioja, James R. Beebe